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Abstract The three monotheistic cultures have many common institutions and some of
them germinated in pre-monarchic Israel. Reasonably, the essential institutions were in
place at that starting point; this work explores the possibility that the Sabbath is one of
these institutions. Our mathematical examination points to the potential cultural, civic, and
social role of the weekly Sabbath, that is, the Sabbath institution, in controlling deviation
from social norms. It begins with an analogy between spread of transgression (defined as
lack of conformity with social norms) and of biological infection. Borrowing well-known
mathematical methods, we derive solution sets of social equilibrium and study their social
stability. The work shows how a weekly Sabbath could in theory enhance social resilience
in comparison with a similar assembly with a more natural and longer period, say between
New Moon and Full Moon. The examination reveals that an efficient Sabbath institution
has the potential to ensure a stable organization and suppress occasional appearances of
transgression from cultural norms and boundaries. The work suggests the existence of a
sharp threshold governed by the “Basic Sabbath Number ש0”—a critical observance of the
Sabbath, or large enough ש0, is required to ensure suppression of transgression.
Subsequently, the model is used to explore an interesting question: how old is the
Sabbath? The work is interdisciplinary, combining anthropological concepts with mathe-
matical analysis and with archaeological parallels in regards to the findings.
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1 Introduction
Especially in recent years, mathematical models have proven to be important tools for shedding
light on complex aspects of human behavior, culture, and communications, and for investigating
topical anthropological questions. Their applications cover a wide spectrum of interest com-
prising, for example, the beginning of the transmission of learned human skills and its relation to
population density andmobility [1]; the study of language selection in bilingual societies [2]; the
effects of Computer Age social networks [3]; the problems of detached human groups as such
that in Tasmania (which separated from Australia at the end of the glacial epoch) [4]; intriguing
analogies between culture propagation and molecular diffusion [5]; and the compliancy of
humans when confronted with different rules of behavior [6–10]. In a similar vein, this article
demonstrates how mathematical modeling approaches may help understand justice administra-
tion systems of societies and their social organization, with a specific focus on the institution of
the Sabbath and its appearance in the early history of Israel. Our approach takes advantage of the
analogy between the spread of epidemics in human populations and the propagation of
transgression (which we define here as violation of social norms) in human society.
Interestingly, similar contagion models have been formulated to express the propagation of
any human behavior that is acquired by learning from others [5]. Before entering into further
details of the model, it is necessary to understand the historical background of the problems
involved, and we thus first outline some relevant concepts concerning societies in early Israel.
There is general consensus that early Iron Age Israel was a transient society composed of an
association of tribes and clans [11–13]. Historians refer to this early period as pre-monarchic
Israel; a period when Israelites had no central government and, in times of crises, were loosely
guided by ad hoc chieftains known as Judges [12]. The precise time range of the period is
controversial; however, it is generally approximated as between the 14th and 10th centuries
BCE. Close to the 10th century BCE, the tribal groups amalgamated to form either one or two
monarchies. In anthropological terms, transition organizations from tribes to states are called
chiefdoms, or middle-range societies [14, 15]. Some of these transient societies shared an
egalitarian ethos consisting of the conviction that all the members of the society are equal (age
and gender discrimination notwithstanding). The archaeological evidence convincingly indi-
cates that an egalitarian ethos existed in pre-monarchic Israel [13]. All cultural descendants of
ancient Israel represented by the three monotheistic religions have, to some extent, kept the
belief that all human beings are created equal. Furthermore, a few of these descendant societies
also shared practical socio-political life styles characterized by a peer relationship between
members rooted in the persuasion of being equal signatories to a covenant. The term covenant
signifies a binding code attributed to a divine source of law setting imperatives of lawful
behavior in a society ruled by an assembly government. The code consists of norms such as
prohibition of idolatry, prohibition of working on the Sabbath, sometimes prohibition of
certain foods, and a multitude of other commandments regulating public life, justice admin-
istration, relations of a congregation with other congregations, and the behavior of individuals
within their family and within their congregation.
These types of societies have been studied by scholars of political science and
termed “covenantal societies” [16–19]. The view that these settlements on the hills of
Samaria and Judea are the archetype of all covenantal societies is not new [20], yet
for our purpose it is not necessary to entail that the covenant was specifically the one
of the Old Testament (see Table 1).
A fundamental difficulty of all sedentary egalitarian societies, including covenantal socie-
ties, is the capability to administer justice without creating institutions such as police and jail
keepers that contradict egalitarian values. Different egalitarian cultures adopted different
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solutions. For example, the Mohawks adopted a system in which social deviation comes into
being when the victim declares feud against his perpetrator. Diagonally opposed to the
covenantal system where transgression, guilt, and consequential punishment play an important
role in keeping its members on track, the Longhouse Justice System solves the problem by
mediation between perpetrator and victim, through an arbitration that “is not a process
grounded upon fact-finding toward a determination of guilt and allocation of punishment,”
[35–37]. In Arab towns and villages, there is a similar system of offense, followed by a cycle
of retributions ending with a negotiated “sulkha,” or settlement ceremony [38]. This tradition
also appears to solve problems in a society with no police. In this paper, we make use of a
mathematical modeling approach to help understand how egalitarian societies have persisted
without the need of pervasive policing or the enforcement of justice systems.
A detailed study of egalitarian societies is beyond the scope of this article. However, Rousseau
(pers. comm.; also see [15]) provided a few examples of the way such societies treat unruly
behavior: some (Iban tribes), do nothing and their villages keep splitting and recombining—the
villages are short-lived; others react to unruliness by constant negotiations (Kayan nation); in other
tribes the chief increases his authority and the society starts its conversion to stratification
(Trobriand tribes). That other societies adopted other solutions, and some adopted no solution,
partially explains the lack of social stability of most egalitarian cultures. (Shortly, we will provide
more formal definitions of stability and make use of the concept of mathematical stability.)
However, some covenantal cultures did last for surprisingly long periods. At least three of the
examples of Table 1 led an autonomous life for centuries as far as justice administration is
concerned. Archaeological excavations in Israel [13] indicate that during the 300 years from early
settlement to the formation of monarchy, the settlers had a classless organization, surprisingly
paralleling the Biblical claim that “there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right
in his own eyes” [Judges 21:25]. No wonder this atypical kingless sedentary society captivated the
scholars. For example, Hackett [12] remarks that Gideon’s refusal to become King is the right
Table 1 Examples of typical covenantal cultures
Name Covenant Office holders Reference
Rabbinical Judaism Torah;Torah-she-Baal-Peh Zekenim; Parnasim;
Vaad Hair; Maamad
Deut 20:6 [21]
Early Christians Christian Bible; Decrees of Council Presbyteros; episkopos [22, 23]







First Calvinistsa Christian Bible; Ecclesial Ordinances;
Edicts of the Lieutenant (of Justice);




Scottish Presbyterians Christian Bible; Westminster Confession Elders; Ministers [29, 30]
English/ American
Puritansb
Christian Bible; Puritan Confession Elders; Ministers;
Pastors
[31, 32]
Pilgrims Christian Bible; Puritan Confession;
Mayflower Compact
Elder; Pastor [33, 34]
a All the other examples forbade working on the Sabbath; the First Calvinists specifically distinguished the
Sabbath as a day of public worship
bWith regard to the Puritans, it is worthwhile to quote clergyman Norton’s description of his New England
frontier experience as: “holding forth a pregnant demonstration of the consistency of Civil-Government with a
Congregational-Way” [31]. This is an astonishingly concise expression of the covenantal concept; the association
of frontier society with a covenantal or egalitarian system is also observed by Elazar [16–20] and by Faust [13]
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attitude for those times. In other words, regardless of the historicity of Gideon’s story, the very fact
that it circulated testifies that the no-king organization was not a matter of random choice, but a
result of a conscious opposition to amortal king.Wewould like to examine themechanism behind
such a long quasi-stability.
By definition, in a covenantal society the members share the conviction of being bound to
the covenant. This conviction empowers congregants to impose on each other obedience,
compliance, and repentance. Consequently, gatherings of the congregation, such as participa-
tion in the weekly Sabbath, significantly increase these effects of corrective action. Our
hypothesis is that the essential stabilizing mechanism involved the institution of the Sabbath.
This is consistent with the observation that all the examples of Table 1 strictly observed the
Sabbath. Our research (see Supplementary Information SI1) revealed that John Calvin formu-
lated this same hypothesis more than four centuries ago. Note that all three monotheistic
cultures guarantee the freedom not to work on Sabbath at least to some extent. In fact, in a
covenantal society, abstaining from work is not a freedom but an obligation.
Our work borrows anthropological terminology for studying the observation of law in
different societies. For example, transgression is characterized by [39] as “conduct that breaks
rules or exceeds boundaries” and “is a key idea for sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural
theorists, and .. a major feature of postmodern thought.” Similarly, we are required to refer to
the concept of repentance. “Individuals who have been excluded in some manner from society
as a result of violating its laws or norms are often required to repent … in order to be
readmitted” [40]; see also [41]. In addition, righteous behavior is defined as “obedience to
the values and mores of one’s society” [42]
While we use these terms freely, it is important to realize that our goal is not to show that
repentance and/or Sabbath actually saves society; instead, we explain that repentance and
Sabbath function as law enforcement mechanisms in the presence of unacceptable behaviors or
transgressions of individuals in society. In this respect, we follow anthropologists who report
what they observe and understand in the behavior of the society they explore, something that
usually requires borrowing terms of the investigated societies. In this respect, these terms
should not be considered religiously charged or given any ethical value.
The Old Testament claims that the Sabbath was observed in pre-monarchic Israel
(Supplementary Information SI1). However, the Old Testament has not been dated and its
testimony is not considered as evidence. Moreover, in spite of the other documents of
Supplementary Information SI1, there is no consensus about the age of the Sabbath. As knowledge
about that period is limited, this investigation opens an additional avenue to learn about it.
The hypothesis that a periodic assembly can substitute for law enforcement implies the
feasibility of several versions of covenantal societies because many cultures had regular
assemblies at moon phases. This work will verify the feasibility of steady-state and stability
when the corrective effect of the Sabbath assembly is approximated by a periodic function.
The analysis provides some new mathematical results regarding periodically forced systems of
this nature. In addition, the model shows that a short period between assemblies significantly
improves the chances to reduce the negative impact of transgressors in society. Based on this
result, the article reasons that the phases of the moon were too far apart and consequently the
odd but sufficiently short 7-day period for the Sabbath prevailed.
2 Models of stratified societies
Social deviation is in equilibrium with society’s reaction against it. This equilibrium is stable if
increments of the disruptive elements are countered by adequate corrective measures that
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constrain unlawfulness within tolerable limits. Most modern societies achieve this by a
complex set of corrective actions that include, among others, law enforcement, religion,
education, social security, and health care. These concepts may be investigated mathematically,
as, for example, in the work of Zhao et al. [6] who describe a complex dynamical model that
includes the mutual effect that poverty, crime, and law enforcement have on each other [6]. In a
similar spirit, the models of Epstein [7] and Rossi [8] explore the interrelationships of drug
addiction, drug pushers, law enforcement, and prisoners.
Equation (1) is the mathematical expression of the simplest model that illustrates the
dynamics of social deviation in the most basic justice system. This “predator–prey” model is
borrowed from mathematical biology, but it has been extended and lies at the basis for the key








Here, all the parameters a, b, c, and d are positive coefficients. In this model, x(t) represents
the numbers of the criminal population at time t, while y(t) represents the size of the police
force. The society reacts by incrementing or reducing the police size y, in a manner that keeps
control of criminal deviants. In this case, according to the common underlying assumption of
random population mixing, the police are able to come into contact and deal with criminals at a
rate that is proportional to the product xy. In terms of the parameters, the average reduction rate
of x due to one policeman catching criminals is b, while the growth ratio of the police per
criminal is c. Note that in the absence of police the criminal population thrives and grows at
per-capita rate a, while in the absence of criminals there is no need for a police force and it will
decline at per-capita rate d.
The advantage of the mathematical formulation of the justice systems of (1) is that it leads
to an unambiguous expression of the system’s conditions of equilibrium, stability, and
dynamics in time. By definition, equilibrium is achieved when the derivatives of all variables
with respect to time are zero. Inspection of Eq. (1) reveals that it has two equilibria; the trivial
extinction equilibrium where everyone dies, both police and criminals (x*=y*=0), and another
positive equilibrium where police and criminals persist x*=d/c>0 and y*=a/b>0.
Stability of the equilibrium may be studied by determining if the system will return to
equilibrium after a small perturbation. This is found by a mathematical procedure that requires
examining the eigenvalues of the so-called Jacobian matrix of each of these equilibrium points
[43]. It is enough that the real part of any eigenvalue is positive, for the system to be unstable;
when all eigenvalues have real parts that are negative, stability is assured [43]. A zero
eigenvalue represents neutral stability or a knifepoint case lying between stability and
instability.
As the literature shows [43], the trivial extinction equilibrium is always unstable. This has
the important implication that in this general type of stratified society, the police force and
criminal subpopulations will never die out. Since the other (positive) equilibrium always has
imaginary eigenvalues with no real parts, oscillatory dynamics between the police and
criminals develop. As criminals rise in numbers, activity of the police force marches in step,
increasing to contain the unlawfulness. The police are eventually able to reduce their size upon
gaining control over the criminal elements. However, as police dwindle, a point is reached
when crime pays yet again. The resulting “cat-and-mouse” game between police and criminals
leads to continuous oscillatory waves of crime.
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3 A model of covenantal egalitarian societies
As our chief interest is the sustainability of typical egalitarian covenantal societies which have
no police, the above model is completely unable to offer an explanation of how social
deviation may be controlled in the absence of such law enforcers.
For that reason, we propose to turn to Eq. (2), which is a variation of the well-known
Kermack-McKendrick epidemiological model (Fig. 1). As mentioned earlier, the covenantal
society is governed by an assembly; the assembly in general and each member of the
congregation in particular are expected to obey a binding code referred to as a covenant
(discussed above; see also SI-1c). In our case, an individual of the congregation regulated by a
covenant can only belong to one of three classes: susceptibles (S) who may be corrupted,
transgressors (T) who disobey, and righteous (R) who obey the covenant. The flow of











In this model, and in accord with the compartmental diagram of Fig. 1, susceptible individuals
are corrupted by interaction with transgressors and join the transgressor class at a rate proportional
to the product ST. After a period of time, followed by repentance, transgressors are able to become
righteous and this occurs at a rate γT. This expression represents an actual measurable proportion
of T converting to R. Finally, righteous individuals may be tempted to lapse from their pious path
to close the STRS loop and once again become susceptible to corruption at a rate αR.
The number of righteous individuals R quantifies the component of the population that
cannot be swayed by transgressors to contravene the covenant. Here we suppose that any
individual who determinedly obeys the covenant is righteous. His/her conviction may be
moral, spiritual, religious, or simply based on some rationale. Similarly, repentance is stopping
disobedience of the covenant and is controlled by the parameter γ. Since adding the three
equations of the model gives dSdt þ dTdt þ dRdt ¼ 0 , the total population size S+T+R=Nmust be a
Fig. 1 Compartmental diagram of the STRS model indicating the cycle of susceptible individuals who, upon
corruption, join the transgressors. With repentance offered via the Sabbath assembly, transgressors (T) transform
to righteous (R) individuals and in time may lapse to become susceptible (S) to corruption once again, thereby
closing the STRS loop
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constant, and N represents the size of the population of the covenantal organization. The time
units of the model are taken to be weeks.
The proposed model needs to be consistent with our hypothesis that the repentance rate γ in
a covenantal society is strongly connected to the Sabbath assembly. Before we examine an
explicit periodic repentance function, we begin with a helpful approximation. We suppose that
a Sabbath having period k weeks, i.e., appearing every k weeks, would ideally be able to ensure
that the lifetime of a typical transgressor is k weeks on average. For the above model, it is not
hard to show that transgressors remain in the T class on average for a period of time-length 1/γ
(discussed further below). Thus in this first simplified model, a weekly Sabbath would require
the life-time of a transgressor to be 1/γ=1 week, although repentance could occur on any day
of the week with equal chance.
Our following the more complex forced model attempts to synchronize the population
dynamics by introducing a “clock” so that the transgressors are encouraged to repent specifically
on the Sabbath. To achieve this, we deviate from the classical constant γ to a periodic one. While
models with time-dependent transmission functions β(t) have been investigated in the past [44], as
far as we know this is the first time an SIRS model is used with time-dependent γ(t).
3.1 Model parameters
The transgression rate β In an epidemic model, β represents the transmission of infection
from an infected (I) individual to a susceptible (S) one at rate βSI. By analogy, we also adopted
βST/N to model the propagation of social deviation and here the value of β measures the
contagiousness of disobedience.
The lapse coefficient α The parameter α is an idealized linear coefficient of the lapse loop (see
Fig. 1). It expresses the rate at which righteous individuals become susceptible to transgres-
sion. Its epidemiological analogue expresses the rate of loss of immunity after infection and
recovery from a disease. One can distinguish three social factors controlling the lapse rate:
1. Poverty increases α because it increases the rate of R→S conversions. This trend has been
known from early covenantal existence [Deuteronomy 15:11] to the beginning of
covenantalism in the New World [31]
2. Openness to foreign cultures increases α (this tendency also was known to early cove-
nantal societies [Exodus 23:13]). This factor has ups and downs along history with
decades of growth followed by decades of decline.
3. Temptation is a general term that comprises everything else; resistance to temptation is
required with the transfer from nomadic pastoralist existence to sedentary life. This is
because egalitarianism is more natural among pastoralists as observed by Schneider [45]
and is explained by the fact that sedentary life allows for surpluses to be stored for worse
times to come. Consequently it was suggested that a sedentary way of life lures some to
accumulate surpluses on the account of others.
The repentance rate γ In the epidemiological analogy, this term symbolizes the rate of
recovery of infected people. In our social analogy, this becomes the repentance rate that
converts T→R. As already discussed, we are able to choose the lifetime of a typical
transgressor (the time in which a person is retained in the T-class) as 1/γ =1 week, to
correspond to the 7-day Sabbath. But the rate may be changed to explore the effects of
different Sabbath periods.
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The Basic Sabbath number ש0=γ/β and cohesion factor γ/α Our investigation shows that
these parameter ratios are sometimes more meaningful than the values of each separate
parameter. In particular, the Basic Sabbath Number ש0=γ/β (pronounced shin zero) is the
reciprocal of the basic reproduction number (β/γ) in epidemiology. We might think of β/γ as
the number of people a typical transgressor could corrupt in a totally susceptible naive
population. In our application, its reciprocal, the Basic Sabbath Number (γ/β), indicates the
resistance of a susceptible to be corrupted by a typical transgressor. Our results indicate that the
Sabbath congregation holds back transgressors from seeding evil (lowers β) and increases
repentance and righteousness (γ). Both of these healthy processes act to increase the Basic
Sabbath Number ש0.
We will refer to the ratio γ/α as the cohesion factor, because the path to righteousness (γ)
expresses cohesion while the lapse rate α acts to corrode the cohesion, e.g., under the influence
of foreign cultures. The larger is the lapse rate, the smaller is the cohesion, and the higher is the
rate that righteous individuals are transferred to the susceptible class.
3.2 Estimating β for heroin addiction
An intriguing epidemiological modeling study of heroin addiction found that a population
beginning with a single addicted person and 50 susceptibles ended up to be a combination of
25 affected and 25 susceptibles in 2.27 weeks to 5.3 weeks. Mackintosh and Stewart’s [46]
simulation showed that this rate of addiction spread is equivalent to a 2% probability that an
encounter of an affected person with a susceptible person results in the conversion of the
susceptible into affected. In other words, on average an addicted person needs 50 encounters
with susceptible individuals in order for one of these individuals to become addicted as well.
We replicated these results in a simulation by insertingN=50; T0=1; S0=50; β=1.46, α=0, γ=
0 in Eq. (2).
The simulation shown in Supplementary Information SI2 also indicates that the total
susceptible population will become affected in approximately 5 weeks; this is consistent with
data collected by Mackintosh and Stewart [46], indicating that 20–50 susceptibles become
heroin addicts in a matter of weeks. Consequently, as a starting point, we adopted a simulation
contagion rate for small congregations, which is approximately β=1.5.
4 Model analysis
4.1 Equilibrium and stability of a covenantal society
Given the population size N is constant, it is possible to reduce the covenantal model to two
differential equations with two variables (S and T) by eliminating the variable R, which can
always be written as R=N-S-T. We arrive at the equations:
dS
dt
¼ α N  S  Tð Þ  βST=N
dT
dt
¼ βST=N  γT
ð3Þ
The point of equilibrium requires that all variables have zero growth rates. This yields two
equilibria whose stability is intimately controlled by the Basic Sabbath Number ש0=γ/β
210 J. Livni, L. Stone
E1: The transgressor-free equilibrium T*=0. By inspection of Eq. (3), one notes that a
transgressor-free equilibrium exists in which:
S* ¼ N; T* ¼ 0; R* ¼ 0 ð4Þ
In other words, the covenantal society is stationary with no transgressors, no righteous, and
everybody susceptible. How long can a society stay at this stationary point? The answer is
given by investigating the local stability at this point of equilibrium.
The transgressor-free equilibrium is stable if both (real) eigenvalues are negative,
which occurs if ש0=γ/β>1, (see Supplementary Information SI2). In this case, the
number of transgressors will tend to decline until the transgression-free stationary point
is reached, as shown in Fig. 2a (i). Note that when sitting at this equilibrium, all
transgressors have been cleared from society, and the population stabilizes or locks
down to a state totally free of transgression. In addition, in this regime, all the righteous
eventually lose their status and become susceptible. Their memories of transgression and
repentance, and thus their righteousness, erode with time. (Nevertheless, we shortly show
how a direct route to righteousness can generate a transgressor-free community that
includes a continuously maintained righteous subpopulation.)
Going further, if ש0 falls below unity then the equilibrium is unstable, and once the






Fig. 2 a Simulation results of a transgression wave contained by the repentance imposed by the pressure of the
Sabbath assemblies in a congregation of N=100 individuals. The line i represents ש0<1; transgressors rise fast in
an epidemic, and finally stabilize to an endemic state. The line ii represents ש0>1; transgressors rapidly fall to
zero. Parameters: cohesion factor =0.4; T0=5; ש0=.6 (i); ש0=1.1 (ii). b Same as (a) but with periodical Sabbath
γ(t)=1+sin(2πt). Note that the response is similar to the responses of (a) except for the occurrence of ripples on
the STRS trajectories; this illustrates that for practical purposes the threshold results of the unforced model are
representative. Parameters: cohesion factor =0.4; T0=5; ש0=0.6, (i); ש0=1.1, (ii)
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(ii). This corresponds to an epidemic of transgressors in the original interpretation of
Eq. (2).
E2: The equilibrium of endemic transgression: T*≥0. The second endemic equilibrium























The equilibrium is only reasonable if ש0=γ/β ≤1, ensuring that the transgressor
population T* is non-negative. Note the interesting interpretation that if γ/β ≤1, then
the proportion of susceptible congregants is exactly equal to the Basic Sabbath
Number.
Similarly, the transgressors are proportional to (1-S/N) or to the proportion of non-
susceptible. The transformation of the non-susceptible congregants into transgressors
and righteous depends only on the cohesion factor γ/α (see Section 3). In a congre-
gation with a cohesion factor γ/α>1, the majority of non-susceptibles are righteous,
otherwise the righteous are the minority. If the cohesion factor is one, then the non-
susceptible split 50–50.
Consider now the stability at this stationary point of endemic transgression. Supplementary
Information SI3 shows that if ש0=γ/β<1, both eigenvalues of the Jacobian always have
negative real parts and the endemic transgression equilibrium is locally stable. This is reached
either asymptotically or by damped oscillations.
As shown in Fig. 3, when ש0>1 the transgressor free equilibrium (T*=0) is stable,
while for ש0<1 the endemic transgression equilibrium (T*>0) is stable. There is a
transcritical bifurcation at ש0=1 where there is a change of stabilities between the
equilibria. The figure indicates that a declining cohesion factor rotates the endemic
transgression equilibrium line clockwise; at a zero cohesion factor the endemic
transgression equilibrium coincides with the transcritical bifurcation point. A growing
cohesion factor rotates the endemic transgression equilibrium counter-clockwise. As
the cohesion factor approaches infinity the endemic transgression becomes almost
transgression-free.
4.2 The Sabbath threshold ש0
In summary, the STRS model of the covenantal society (3) has two equilibria governed by the
Basic Sabbath Number ש0=γ/β as portrayed in Fig. 3. When this number is unity, the model
has a transcritical bifurcation [47]. There is an exchange of stability between these equilibria at
the bifurcation so that for large Basic Sabbath Numbers (ש0>1) the covenantal society is
transgression-free and stable. The model then predicts a congregation of 100% susceptible
members with no transgressors.
When the Basic Sabbath Number falls below the Sabbath threshold point (ש0<1), the
transgression-free equilibrium becomes unstable, and transgressors are able to proliferate until
the congregation reaches a new equilibrium and the non-susceptible population will split
according to the cohesion factor (see Eq. (5) and Fig. 3). The number of transgressors at
equilibrium reduces as the cohesion factor increases. On this side of the bifurcation, the
endemic transgression equilibrium will be stable with a constant component of corrupting
transgressors.
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Figure 2a shows simulation results of (3) comparing the responses (S, T) of a
vigorous society with large Sabbath number (ש0>1) with the responses of a
congregation that slipped into the endemic transgression domain ש0<1. The
appearance of a small number of transgressors (T/N=5%) is easily overcome by a
quick return to a transgression-free equilibrium in the healthy society while the same
small number grows to a high endemic transgression rate when ש0 moves above the
threshold. In this way, the Sabbath threshold is the key determinant of the stability of
the system. This section shows that as far as the mathematics is concerned, the model
can function with a constant repentance mechanism. However, the covenantal reality
offers no permanent corrective institution and our hypothesis is that the correction is
related to the weekly assembly. Consequently, we now proceed to postulate a periodic
Sabbath institution in the covenantal societies of Table 1.
5 Effects of an explicit periodic Sabbath
Public life in a covenantal system flows to the beat of the weekly Sabbath pulsation. The
working week in these societies is summed up by, and parallels, the Biblical quotation: “Six
days you shall labor, and do all your work; but the seventh day is a Sabbath …” [Exodus
20:18]. When modeling a weekly Sabbath, it is reasonable to represent the repentance rate γ as
a periodic function with the fundamental period of 1 week




where γ symbolizes the time average or mean value of γ, γn symbolizes the amplitude
of its nth harmonic and ω=2π. Typically, one might take γ(t)=1+sin(2πt) as a very
simple approximation whereby the forcing is sinusoidal with ω chosen to have period
of 1 week, and the forcing amplitude given by δ. Of course, ω can be chosen to have
Fig. 3 The transgressor equilibrium T* of the STRS model is plotted as a function of the Basic Sabbath Number ש0
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any period we choose to investigate, and is not necessarily restricted to have a weekly
period. Equation (3) becomes:
dS
dt
¼ α N  S  Tð Þ  βST=N
dT
dt
¼ βST=N  γ tð ÞT
ð7Þ
Supplementary Information SI3 illustrates that the interpretation of 1=γ is again the average
time an individual remains a transgressor before he/she is able to repent sufficiently to move to
the righteous class. For the simpler model Eq. (3), where γ is a constant, the transgressor-free
society exists when ש0≥1 and below that value the society will settle at a stable T*/N.
However, our analysis has not yet explicitly taken into account the periodicity of the
Sabbath and we cannot be sure how this might affect the results so far. Could this periodic
forcing jeopardize the stability condition entailed by the Sabbath threshold? In Supplementary




¼ α N  S  Tð Þ  βST=N
dT
dt
¼ βST=N  γT
ð8Þ
We refer to Eq. (7) as the forced model and Eq. (8) as the unforced model. The Appendix
shows that under an explicit periodic Sabbath the stability condition of the transgressor-free
steady state is unchanged, namely ש0 ¼ γ=β > 1 , for both forced and unforced models. In
addition, Supplementary Information SI3 shows that for all practical purposes the average
steady state of the S and T responses to a periodic γ(t) are the same as the responses to a
constant γ ¼ γ .
Figure 2b illustrates simulation results of the two congregations with γ(t)=1+sin(2πt) as
compared to Fig. 2a. The simulations use a periodical time variant repentance rate and have the
strongest possible amplitude of Sabbath forcing (given the constraint that always γ(t)≥0). The
results confirm that the average of the steady-state responses of the pulsating γ is practically
the same as the steady state when a constant γ is used (Fig. 2a), and the threshold is
unchanged, as detailed further in Supplementary Information SI3.
In summary, for both the simpler unforced model and the more realistic forced model, the
same generic threshold is retained and similarly the same steady state values are found. The
periodic forcing has little effect on these key characteristics. It does, however, offer a means of
achieving a transgressor-free state through weekly Sabbath assemblies rather than corrective
activities that are operating continuously every second of the day.
6 Direct route to righteousness
In the above analysis, it was assumed that righteousness could only be achieved as an outcome
of transgression. That is, a susceptible individual transgressed and through the aid of Sabbath
repentance achieved righteousness. But another plausible route is through the ability of
Sabbath to harden susceptible individuals to a degree that they can resist temptation of
transgression, and move directly to the righteous class without ever transgressing. This direct
route to righteousness is rather similar to a vaccination process whereby the Sabbath immu-
nizes individuals from transgression.
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We can model this as a weekly Sabbath pulse in which the proportion p of susceptible
individuals move to the R compartment.
dS
dt
¼ αR βST=N  p
X∞
n¼0
S nTð Þ δ t  nτð Þ
dT
dt
¼ βST=N  γT
ð9Þ
Here, τ is the time interval between Sabbath to Sabbath, which in usual practice we know to
be 1 week. Pulses are applied via the Dirac delta-function and appear as impulses at the
discrete times t=n τ (n=0, 1, 2, …) and the moment immediately before the nth pulse is
notated here as t=nT− The train of pulses generated by the delta function creates jump
discontinuities in the variable S(t), which suddenly decreases by the proportion p whenever
t=nτ.
Figures 4 and 5 show simulations of this model for different values of τ and with p=0.5, so
that 50% of susceptible become righteous due to the Sabbath congregation. Figure 4 features a
fortnightly Sabbath (τ=2 weeks) and illustrates how the susceptible numbers suddenly drop by
50% each such Sabbath. Under these conditions, the direct route to righteousness is unable to
hold down transgression, which appears to persist permanently in the congregation. In
contrast, Fig. 5 shows that with a more frequent weekly Sabbath, transgressors eventually
disappear. This is despite the fact that the Basic Sabbath Number is less than unity where
transgression should spread unhampered.
A detailed investigation of pulsed equations similar to Eq. (9) may be found in [48, 49].
There, mathematical criteria are derived for determining the threshold point, though these
criteria largely fall outside the scope of this paper. In brief though, it is found that the
transgressor-free state is stabilized as long as the Basic Sabbath Number ש0 is greater than
Fig. 4 Pulsed STRS model simulations using Eq. (9). The fortnightly impulses abruptly reduce susceptible
numbers by p=0.5. Nevertheless, transgressors persist in time. Parameters: α=0.63; β=1.5; γ=0.9; τ=2; S0=
0.1; T0=0.01; p=0.5
The stabilizing role of the Sabbath in pre-monarchic Israel 215
the proportion of susceptibles averaged over τ weeks. The criterion is essentially the same as
that for models 1 and 3, except that for the latter models the proportion of susceptibles is unity
at the transgression-free steady state. This means the threshold point for Eq. (9) differs by a
factor corresponding to the inverse of the average proportion of susceptibles.
Finally, we note that under some conditions, the pulsed equations (Eq. 9) have the
ability to generate complex nonlinear oscillations whereby transgressors exhibit wild
chaotic and unpredictable cycles. Figure 6 illustrates one such example whereby in
addition to the strong Sabbath repentance (γ=1), a biannual event reduces S and
increases R every 2 years (104 weeks). Although this is admittedly an unusual
Fig. 5 Pulsed STRS model simulations using Eq. (9). The weekly Sabbath impulses abruptly reduce susceptible
numbers by p=0.5. Transgressors eventually die out. Parameters: α=0.63; β=1.5; γ=0.9; τ=1; S0=0.1; T0=.01;
p=0.5
Fig. 6 Pulsed STRS model simulations using Eqns. 9 in the chaotic regime. An impulse is given every two
years (rather than every week in Figure 5) and abruptly reduce susceptible numbers by p=0.5. Transgressors
eventually die out. Parameters: α=.00027; β=10; γ=1; τ=104 weeks; S0=.1; T0=.0001; p=0.1
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situation, it demonstrates that periodic annual events can create havoc to the system
given the rarity of their occurrence.
7 Discussion
7.1 SIR models with periodic coefficients
It was found that in some applications (such as the study of thresholds), the behavior of SIRS
models with a periodic coefficient γ(t) may be understood from a study of the reduced simpler
models having a constant γ ¼ γ (see Appendix). A similar observation was noted for SIR
models with periodic transmission terms β(t) [44, 50, 51].
7.2 The age of the Sabbath
Our knowledge about Sabbath assemblies before the Second Temple is based on the
biblical account only (Supplementary Information SI1). However, one knows with
certainty that Second Temple Israel (516 BCE to 70 CE) observed the Sabbath (see
Supplementary Information SI1 [52, 53]). Consequently, the Sabbath institution is at
least 2,000 years old. Israel managed its justice administration quasi-autonomously at
the end of this period. Section 4 explained the potential stabilizing role of the Sabbath
institution in the covenantal societies of Table 1. Rabbinical Judaism is one of these,
and it appeared during the Second Temple period.
Pre-monarchic Israel resembled Second Temple Israel: they were both settled, egali-
tarian societies and surrounded by strong stratified cultures. The archaeological evidence
shows that a practically transgression-free society existed in pre-monarchic Israel as far
as idolatry [54], pork consumption [13, 54], circumcision [13], and rules prohibiting
imported pottery [13] are concerned. The model predicts that if the Sabbath existed in
pre-monarchic Israel, then a transgression-free equilibrium was achievable. The mathe-
matical model alone cannot prove a pre-monarchic origin of the Sabbath but it does
support it.
7.3 The seventh day: feasibility of a weekly Sabbath and comparison with a bi-weekly
assembly
The results of the analysis show that the main stabilizing role of the Sabbath consists in
keeping the congregation away from transgression and that requires a favorable above-
threshold Basic Sabbath Number (ש0=γ/β>1). This can be achieved either by a relatively
small β or large γ. Is a weekly Sabbath sufficient to satisfy ש0=γ/β>1? Since γ<1/τ, (see S3.4)
the numerical answer is that only for β≤1 could a weekly Sabbath (τ=1) ensure a
transgression-free society. The previous section noted that archaeological excavations revealed
negligible idolatry, strict observance of dietary rules, and strict observation of pottery practices.
These may be acting together to reduce β below unity.
In order to obtain a comparative estimate for the parameter β, we take up the
metaphor of a transgression that spreads as heroin addiction in modern society. This
allows us to use results of Mackintosh and Stewart [46], which imply a contagion rate
of β=1.5 (see Model parameters in Section 3 above). Studying this contagion rate can
shed light on the hypothetical question as to whether a covenantal society could fight
against drug addiction. We thus see that a covenantal society can neither terminate
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drug addiction spreading with a rate of β=1.5 nor assure a transgression-free society
for transgressions spreading with such a rate. This hints that the heroin addiction rate
obtained from [46] is faster than the propagation rate of the above-mentioned trans-
gressions of pre-monarchic Israel.
We have seen that a general understanding of the Sabbath model may be gained by
choosing the repentance rate γ as a constant since some aspects of the model’s
behavior are qualitatively similar and sometimes equivalent to the case where γ is
periodic. Recall that γ is directly proportional to the assembly frequency, (see
Eq. S3.4) and, assuming reasonably that α and β remain constant, this allows us to
compare weekly and bi-weekly assembly communities. Clearly a weekly repentance
rate will be twice as great in a congregation holding a weekly Sabbath than in a
congregation assembling bi-weekly, all other things being equal. From this
perspective:
a) For a given β, the Basic Sabbath Number ש0 associated with a weekly Sabbath is double
that of a bi-weekly Sabbath.
b) Consider the proportion of transgressors T*/N in a congregation that is below the
Sabbath threshold. It is easy to see that the transgressors for a weekly Sabbath
will be less than half that of the community holding its assemblies once in a
fortnight.
These aspects provide some understanding as to why a weekly Sabbath is better able to
preserve communities and it outlines the stabilizing role of the Sabbath in covenantal
organizations.
Perhaps the most significant question that needs to be addressed is: “Why 7 days?” First we
must ask whether a daily Sabbath is feasible. Obviously a daily general assembly would
produce a considerable opportunity to win over transgressors, so that the weekly percentage of
newly recruited righteous would be impressive. Yet, a society with a daily call for a general
assembly is on its way to oligarchy, and should be seen as completely impractical. One might
expect that a feasible periodic assembly should be based on the lunar calendar interval of a
month. Thus, the next interval would be a natural period as half a month or a month. We now
consider reasons why this did not happen.
Ample and consistent evidence collected by other investigations about later com-
munities [55–57] reveals that the chances of a congregation to survive were signifi-
cantly lower than the chances to fail. This is also consistent with the fact that
communities did slip below the threshold. Other communities may have prevailed
because they experienced a favorable β in the sense that a weekly Sabbath managed
to hold them close to the threshold and above it. When taken together, this collective
information would imply that in early covenantal communities maintaining a weekly
Sabbath, the Basic Sabbath Number was critically close to unity. Changing the
Sabbath to a bi-weekly event could reduce the Basic Sabbath Number to well below
unity and would also result in a much larger coherence factor. Thus, the weekly
Sabbath appears to be the most workable solution. We note, however, that our work
found nothing special about the precise interval of 7 days.
Our thesis is that the Fourth Commandment is a concept that covenetal societies latched
onto in pre-monarchic Israel from the very beginning of the settlement. This work demon-
strates that a weekly Sabbath can control social deviation in covenantal organizations.
Consequently, short of an alternative stabilizing mechanism, the Sabbath had to be in place
in pre-monarchic Israel when it was most badly needed.
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8 Conclusions
We note that the model lacks concrete testable predictions, being difficult to validate against
archaeological or other evidence. It nevertheless makes a number of interesting predictions:
1. At the conceptual level, the weekly Sabbath was likely viewed as an essential stabilizing
function in later covenantal societies.
2. Although no period of assemblies can guarantee with certainty the social stability of a
covenantal society, a weekly period appears reasonable.
3. The following covenantal institutions are vital for the survival of a covenantal society:
& Weekly assemblies of the congregation; the strict observance of the Sabbath
rules assured compliance with this condition in all the covenantal societies
known so far.
& Understanding the concepts of commandment and transgression.
4. Covenantal societies are not easy to copy and even more difficult to invent. They require a
proper combination of combating poverty, resisting external influence, avoiding tempta-
tion, encouraging righteousness, and observing the Sabbath.
5. This investigation illustrates how mathematical techniques that study epidemics may be
useful to understand a specific population equilibrium and stability problem in other
contexts. The rich knowledge about SIR models offers quick results and easier investiga-
tions of other possible population dynamics applications.
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Appendix
Threshold of an SIRS with periodic repentance coefficient
We show that the threshold the infection-free steady-state of an SIRS model with periodic
γ(t), as in Eq. (7), is the same as that found by replacing the function γ(t) in Eq. (8) with its
mean value γ . The argument is adapted from [42], which deals with a periodic transmission
term. First, recall that a stable transgressor-free equilibrium of model (Eq. 8) is assured if ש0>
1, (see Section 4, above). We first linearize system (Eq. 7) about its transgression-free steady-
state to obtain:
T
: ¼ β  γ tð Þ½ T
This linear equation is solvable:
T tð Þ ¼ T 0ð Þe ∫
t
0
βγ τð Þdτ½  ¼ T 0ð Þe βt∫
t
0
γ τð Þdτ ¼ T 0ð Þe βγð Þt
Thus, for the above linear system T(∞)=0 T(∞)=0 if ש0=γβ > 1 ;T (∞)→∞ if ש0<1.
Thus the steady-state of Eqn.7 is stable only if ש0>1. Yet this is the same criteria
as Eq. (8), the SIRS model obtained by replacing the function γ(t) in Eq. (7) with its
mean value γ .
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